Policing the Drumcree Demonstrations in Northern Ireland: Testing Leadership Theory In Practice

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At issue is an annual Church Parade by some 1200 members of the all Protestant Orange Order and two bands who insist on what they see as their inalienable civil right to march along the Garvaghy Road in Portadown despite the fact that the Catholic community who live there are overwhelmingly opposed to the passage of the march and believe it is their right not to have to endure it. While many Orangemen regard the Order as a religious and cultural institution, others cherish it as an instrument of supremacy for asserting domination over Catholics. (Ryder C and Kearney V, 2001: xvi)

Practising What We Teach and Teaching What We Practice

This article is a case study of radical change in the leadership strategy for the policing of the annual Drumcree Sunday demonstrations in Northern Ireland between 2002 and 2004. It is co-authored by an academic and a practitioner who were both involved in different ways in the development and implementation of the alternative strategy now in practice. Benington researches and teaches public leadership and public value on the Warwick MPA degree – a public sector MBA. Turbitt was, at the time, a chief superintendent in the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and a participant in the Warwick MPA degree course from 2000 to 2003.

Turbitt was first given responsibility, as Silver Commander, for the policing of the Drumcree demonstrations in 2002. He decided that a new strategy was needed to ease the hostilities and to transform the conflict, which had been extremely violent for almost 20 years, between the protestant unionist marchers and the catholic republican residents of the area, with the police sandwiched in the middle.

Turbitt decided to test an alternative approach to the policing strategy, based upon an application and development of theories of Public Value (Moore, 1995) and of Adaptive Leadership (Heifetz, 1994) which he had been introduced to by Benington on the Warwick MPA degree course. He invited Benington to shadow him and the police and the army during the annual Drumcree Sunday demonstrations in July 2002, July 2003 and July 2004, and in various parts of the preparation and de-briefing for the July events. Benington was given free access to discussions with police and
army officials, and was also able to spend time with key spokesmen for both sides in the dispute (senior figures in the Protestant Orange Order, and the mainly Republican Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition) – including visiting some key figures in their homes for confidential discussions.

Turbitt and Benington discussed the events as they unfolded during the day and late into the night – a process helped by sharing a portacabin at the army barracks where the police were billeted for the weekend of the demonstrations.

Turbitt wrote up this case study of adaptive leadership as his dissertation for the Warwick MPA. He was later promoted to Assistant Chief Constable and seconded to work as deputy director of the Home Office Police Standards Unit. He has now retired from the Police Service and has become an Associate Fellow at Warwick Business School’s Institute of Governance and Public Management (IGPM) where he teaches leadership to public managers – including to Warwick MPA students sitting in the same class as he sat in 2000. This article is therefore based upon Turbitt’s first hand experience as the Police Silver Commander for the whole operation (plus critical reflection upon the theory in the light of this practice, in his Warwick MPA dissertation, and in his subsequent teaching work on Warwick courses) and upon Benington’s participant observation and field notes taken at Drumcree weekends each July over three successive years.

This leadership case study therefore has a number of strengths and weaknesses. Firstly, one of the key actors in the case study (Irwin Turbitt) is contributing to the account and to the discussion from firsthand experience. This adds greatly to the texture and immediacy of the story, but inevitably will privilege his particular perspective on events, and will over-shadow alternative perspectives from other actors and stakeholders (though some other voices will also be considered, both from the literature and from interviews).

Secondly, the case study is ongoing rather than complete – the Drumcree demonstrations continue each 12 July weekend, and new developments are occurring each year (compared to many other leadership case studies based upon past events and dead leaders e.g. Winston Churchill, John F Kennedy and Ernest Shackleton). The case study therefore has both a prospective as well as a retrospective perspective.

Thirdly, the key ‘leader’ (Turbitt) is consciously applying, testing, and adapting particular academic theories of ‘adaptive leadership’ (Heifetz, 1994) and of ‘public value’ (Moore, 1995), taught on the Warwick MPA course in which he had been a participant. This provides an unusually clear and compelling interpretation of the case, but may run the risk of pre-packaged learning. It will be important to pay close attention to the complexities and the paradoxes of the leadership challenge and of the decision-making situation in this case, rather than generalizing too quickly from theory.

Fourthly, Benington is also a partisan in the process. He is one place removed from the action at Drumcree, but is by no means an independent or neutral commentator. He leads the Warwick MPA module on Leadership, Strategy and Value, and draws heavily on the work of Ron Heifetz and of Mark Moore, both of whom are personal friends as well as academic colleagues. Benington was also one of the supervisors for Turbitt’s MPA Dissertation on Drumcree. It will be for the reader to test for themselves whether and how far these ‘insider’ views and committed perspectives help or hinder their own analysis and learning from the case.
Irwin Turbitt’s Story

In 2000 I was the head of the Performance Development Unit at National Police Training (NPT), a post I was filling on secondment to the Home Office from the (then) Royal Ulster Constabulary. While in this post I began the Warwick Business School’s MPA (public sector MBA) course, and in October 2000 completed the first one-week residential module – ‘Strategy, Leadership and Values in a Democratic Context’. I had long been interested in leadership theory and practice and had been drawn to the MPA course as a result of a conversation with John Benington at an open day at Warwick University in May 2000. The attraction for me was to discover an academic who was interested in strengthening the relationship between theory and practice, and not just in theory but in practice. We both agreed that the purpose of theory was to improve practice and that improved practice should help develop better theory. My first MPA essay, submitted in November 2000, was a ‘Case Study of Leadership in a Governmental or Non-governmental Setting’. I wrote about Dame Geraldine Keegan, the head teacher of St Mary’s College in the Creggan area of Derry in Northern Ireland, and compared her practice to Heifetz’s theory of adaptive leadership to which I had been introduced by Benington as MPA module leader. It was not the most rigorous piece of research ever but I knew the situation well, having worked closely with St Mary’s, and could see how in achieving her success she had, without knowing it, followed Heifetz’s approach.

In December 2001 I was appointed Commander of the Craigavon District Command Unit (DCU), outside Belfast. Craigavon is one of the busiest DCUs in Northern Ireland; it was designed as a ‘new town in the late 1960’s to subsume the two existing towns of Lurgan and Portadown, but this was not a great success. It is, though, a very interesting area with a range of difficult policing challenges such as drugs, race crime, burglary and alcohol-related crime, as well as specific Northern Ireland issues such as paramilitary activity and, of course, the ‘Drumcree’ demonstrations which take place each July between protestant unionists and catholic republicans. I had some previous experience of policing at Drumcree and had worked there at the July weekends over a number of years since 1986.

Following my return to Northern Ireland from my National Police Training role, I had spent the first three months in North Belfast, working on the ‘Holy Cross’ school dispute which had lasted for 14 weeks from 3rd September to 23rd November. During this period, three times a day, five days a week, the police mounted a large scale operation to protect Roman Catholic school children walking along a 285 m stretch of road – considered protestant – and through a protest mounted by the residents of that area. Like most disputes in Northern Ireland it had its roots in a long contested history of bitter sectarianism on both sides. Also like most such disputes, there was little or no civilized contact between the two sides and the police found themselves in the middle.

After nine weeks there was a one-week half-term break and during that period I reviewed our operation, starting from first principles rather than from where we were then. We devised a four-stage plan for what we called ‘enforced normality’ and I explained this to both sides on the weekend before school recommenced. Essentially, we accepted that both sides were not going to behave reasonably and so we were going to use state force to ensure that neither side could benefit from the situation.
Interestingly, and somewhat to my surprise, within a week both sides were in face-to-face talks and the protest ended within three weeks.

Another aspect that troubled me, as a police officer, about ‘Holy Cross’ was our lack of success in prosecuting people associated with these events for the serious offences they were committing. I had tried to encourage a smarter approach to the collection of evidence by using officers and technology not directly involved in the public order operation. I had been a front line officer in such situations for 15 years and knew that it was almost impossible to collect evidence while being attacked by crowds throwing stones, paint and petrol bombs, and with the ever-present risk of explosive devices and shooting attacks.

As I started, in early 2002, to think about the policing of ‘Drumcree’ and other difficult public order events in Craigavon, I reflected on my experience with the Holy Cross dispute in North Belfast, my previous experience in public order policing and my involvement at ‘Drumcree’ as a Bronze Commander in previous years. In May 2001, at another difficult Orange Order parade in Portadown, 68 police officers had been injured and it was made clear to me by my new Assistant Chief Constable boss that a repeat of such a situation would not be acceptable. This provided me, as Silver Commander for Drumcree in 2002, with the opportunity to look at a change in approach. It was clear to all in the police that the previous approach had not been successful and so change was not only expected but hoped for.

As I continued to combine my role in ‘Drumcree’ with study on the Warwick MPA, I decided that the requirement to complete a research project and write a dissertation provided me with the opportunity to test Heifetz’s theory of adaptive leadership in the real world of planning and commanding the policing operation for ‘Drumcree Sunday’ in 2002 and 2003. In doing so, I could reflect on my experience in a manner that practitioners seldom have an opportunity to do.

In an article based on an interview with Ron Heifetz, Taylor said that people who engage in adaptive leadership require:

- a stomach for conflict and uncertainty – among their people and within themselves. This requires an experimental mind-set and an acceptance that some decisions will work and some won’t. It means that some projects will pay off, some won’t. But every decision and every project will provide opportunities to learn something about how the world is changing – and about how your organisation compares with its competition. (1999: 132)

I had seen, from my research, that Geraldine Keegan was just such a person. And I knew that the world of policing in which I was required to work in Craigavon was full of conflict and uncertainty, and I felt that Heifetz’s theory offered me an opportunity to create real public value in a very difficult situation. I was a public servant because I wanted to create public value and I was doing the Warwick MPA because I believed in the usefulness of practitioners learning theory and using it to improve their practice. Here was an opportunity to do so.

Additionally, Heifetz makes it clear that this is not an ‘if the shoe fits wear it’ sort of theory. It is a set of:

- concrete prescriptions resting on hypothesis immediately relevant for anyone who needs to take the lead in almost any sort of social situation under almost any organisational conditions. (Heifetz 1994: 1)
I was conscious that the theory had been developed from an examination of a number of real world cases and the discussion of these in programmes with public managers at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, but that the cases and the discussions had preceded the development of the theory. If the theory had value then it should be possible to apply it and report on the experience.

‘Drumcree’ has a long and continuing history and is far from being resolved, so the fact that this is a theory that claims ‘to evaluate leadership in process, rather than wait until the outcome is clear’ (Heifetz 1994: 24) means that it should be possible to draw useful conclusions from a situation that is still very much a live problem, and also to complete the whole cycle of theory building, theory testing and theory validation and development.

The Drumcree Conflict: History and Background

The Drumcree case is of course set within the wider context of deep-seated and long standing sectarian conflicts within Ireland. Some historians have analyzed the crucial divisions as dating from the Reformation in the 16th century and the plantation and religious wars of the 17th century, and persisting through the Enlightenment, and later periods of famine, industrial revolution and mass democratic politics (Mulholland, 2002). The cross-cutting conflicts between unionists and republicans, and between protestants and catholics, which surface at Drumcree thus have very deep roots in history and culture, as well as in politics and religion, and this is experienced in the here and now of Northern Ireland in terms of divided communities, segregated schools and sectarian bias within many workplaces in both the public and private sectors.

The particular phase of the Northern Ireland conflict in which this case study of Drumcree is set (2002 to 2004) is over-shadowed by the signing of the historic Good Friday peace agreement in 1998. This was based upon a power-sharing arrangement which gave representatives of each community a veto over the other, in a devolved assembly. The British Secretary of State was to remain responsible for non-devolved matters – significantly, law and order – and to represent Northern Ireland in the UK.

Although the peace agreement had been signed on 10 April 1998, and endorsed by the public in a referendum in May 1998, only very limited progress had been made beyond this point. Republicans were determined not to appear to be seen as the defeated army so refused to decommission their weapons unilaterally. Unionists were unhappy with plans for the early release of political prisoners, and for the termination of the (largely Protestant) Royal Ulster Constabulary and its re-branding as the (non-sectarian) Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Elections to the newly created Northern Ireland Assembly had been held in June 1998, but the establishment of the Northern Ireland Executive was delayed by arguments over whether the Irish Republican Army (IRA) should be required to decommission its weapons in advance of its political wing, Sinn Fein, being allowed to take their seats on the Executive. Power was eventually devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly on 30 Nov 1999 on the understanding that decommissioning would begin to take place once the Assembly was fully functional. However, by February 2000, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, had suspended the Assembly on the grounds that insufficient decommissioning had taken
leadership 3(4) article

figure 1

Drumcree Sunday Parade Routes

1807–1985 Town Centre – Obins St – Charles St – Dungannon Road to Drumcree Parish Church returning down the Garvaghy Road to the town centre

1985–1994 Town Centre – Corcrain Rd – Charles St – Dungannon Road to Drumcree Parish Church returning down the Garvaghy Road to the town centre

1995–1996 Town Centre – Corcrain Rd – Charles St – Dungannon Road to Drumcree Parish Church stopped at Drumcree bridge but later permitted to return down the Garvaghy Road to the town centre

1997 Town Centre – Corcrain Rd – Charles St – Dungannon Road to Drumcree Parish Church permitted down the Garvaghy Road to the town centre

1998–date Town Centre – Corcrain Rd – Charles St – Dungannon Road to Drumcree Parish Church stopped at Drumcree bridge
place. The Assembly was restored in May 2000 when the IRA pledged to put its weapons ‘beyond use’ and to open some of its weapons dumps to inspection by international monitors. In November 2000, the First Minister of the Assembly, David Trimble, banned Sinn Fein Ministers from participation in the north-south bodies in order to force progress on IRA decommissioning. However, failure to achieve progress on this led to his resignation as first Minister in July 2001. (Gormley-Heenan, 2006, 2007)

In the UK general election shortly afterwards, the Northern Ireland parties polarized even further, with parliamentary seats being gained by the Democratic Unionist Party (led by Ian Paisley) at the expense of the more moderate Ulster Unionist Party (led by David Trimble), and by Sinn Fein (led by Gerry Adams) at the expense of the more moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) (led by John Hume). Some commentators noted that by the summer of 2001, the gulf between the two communities was deeper and wider than at any time in the previous 30 years (Mulholland, 2002)

This is the backdrop against which the Drumcree case is set. The ‘Drumcree Sunday’ parade itself has been associated with incidents of disorder, terrorism and even murder long before the most recent troubles.

The events that lie at the heart of this situation are from one perspective rather simple: one group of citizens (Orangemen from Loyal Orange Lodge No 1) march from their meeting hall in Portadown to Drumcree Parish Church, usually on the first Sunday in July each year, for a religious service at 11.30am where they commemorate those who lost their lives in the first world war battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916. Following the service they march back to their starting point in Portadown. Their preferred return route includes the Garvaghy Road where another group of citizens – the nationalist residents represented by the Garvaghy Road Residents Committee, GRRC – reside.

This annual march has been taking place since 1807 and has a history that confounds the simple factual description above. This is due mainly to the historic importance of Portadown as the town closest to where the loyalist Orange Order was formed on 21 September 1795, the status of Portadown District as the first district in the Orange Order (formed on 12 July 1796), the changing demographic and political profile of the area, and the specific events since 1985.

There are at least three different interests and perspectives in play during the Drumcree parade each July: the Protestant Loyalist Unionist group, the Catholic Republican Nationalist group, and the State (including not only the police, but also the UK government, the British army and local elected councillors). More specifically these three interests are represented by, or reflected in, three main organizations: Portadown District of the Orange Order (LOL No 1), The Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition (GRRC), and the Police (known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary until Nov 2001 and renamed as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) since then).

‘Drumcree’ is often seen as a marching problem but the marching is simply the outward symptom of a much more fundamental issue. As Seamus Mallon, SDLP Deputy Leader, said during Northern Ireland Questions in The House of Commons in London (July 1996) ‘The marches have not to do with who marched that road, but whose writ runs in Northern Ireland’.

To explain how ‘Drumcree’ came to be so important in Northern Ireland it is
necessary to review the history that preceded these events. The first question is: is the Orange Order a religious or a political organization, or both? According to Arnold Hatch, Mayor of Craigavon (Portadown Times, 11 July 1985), ‘The Orange Order is a Christian non-political organisation’. This would seem to be confirmed by the qualifications of membership as quoted by McKay (2000):

an Orangeman should ‘cultivate truth and justice . . . obedience to the laws; his deportment must be gentle and compassionate . . . he should honour and diligently study the holy scriptures . . . abstain from all cursing and profane language’. He should, above all, be a Protestant ‘never in any way connected with the Church of Rome’ whose ‘fatal errors’ he should ‘strenuously oppose’, while ‘abstaining from all uncharitable words, actions or sentiments’ towards Catholics.

The first recorded instance of an Orange Service being held at the Drumcree Church was in July 1807. The route out to Drumcree Church included Obins Street, entered from the town centre through The Tunnel, where the Nationalists lived, and an early flash-point. The first recorded incident of Orangemen being attacked in The Tunnel occurred in July 1873. It was reported that 100 Police with fixed bayonets confronted an Orange mob and during the disturbance several people were injured and one killed by Police bayonets (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 36).

In 1905 Patrick Falloon, a Catholic, was watching an Orange Parade pass through Obins Street when he was confronted by Thomas Cordoner, a Protestant, who produced a revolver and shot him dead. Prolonged rioting between the Police and several hundred Orangemen then started, and that evening, the Police blocked the mouth of Obins Street to prevent another Orange Parade going through The Tunnel area (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 37).

Fast forward to Sunday 9th of July 1972: hundreds of members of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), clad in masks and paramilitary uniforms, escorted the Orangemen through The Tunnel into Obins Street to ensure their march was not impeded (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 47–52).

On Sunday 6th of July 1975, in an effort to halt the march, bombs were planted in derelict houses in Obins Street, set to detonate whilst the parade was passing. Following a bomb warning, the Security Forces searched the entire parade route and located two devices – one containing 5lbs of explosives, and the other 10lbs – and defused them, thus enabling the parade to proceed (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 68).

Historically, there has also been a close link between Drumcree and Portadown and the wider political scene in Northern Ireland. The Orange Order was pivotally involved in the campaign that persuaded the British government to partition Ireland in 1922 and to create a Northern Ireland remaining within the United Kingdom, while the rest of Ireland gained independence as a Republic. The first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland was James Craig, a leading Orangeman, and later honoured as Lord Craigavon of Stormont. In 1932 he said ‘I am an Orangeman first and a politician and member of this parliament afterwards’ (Bardon: 539).

The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), formed in 1922 when the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) was disbanded, were faced continuously with policing parades, and successive Chief Constables from as early as 1970 were indicating the costs of this. Chief Constable, Sir Graham Shillington, wrote in his 1970 Annual Report:
Many of these events carried enormous danger potentially in a city where experience has shown that even minor incidents can generate widespread and vicious rioting. While parades do not represent the sole danger to peace and order, it would nevertheless be a single contribution if the organisers of such efforts, wherever they may be, were to co-operate more fully with the Police in a selection of routes which avoided flashpoints as far as possible.

In his 1975 annual report, Sir Kenneth Newman, who had come from Scotland Yard to help rebuild and reorganise the RUC after the trauma of 1969, wrote:

No serious incident took place but the fact that some 14,860 Police Officers had to be transported to events throughout the Province gave some indication of the heavy demands made on the overstretched resources of the Force.

In 1979, Jack Hermon, a local officer who replaced Newman, wrote in his first Annual Report, in 1980:

It is worth mentioning that all too often large numbers of Police personnel have to be deployed to deal with politically inspired parades and demonstrations, many of which pose a serious threat to public order. It is unfortunate after the experience of more than a decade of violence and civil disturbance, that such activities have not been abandoned in favour of less inflammatory forms of political expression.

Some five years later having tried all other means, Hermon decided it was time to make more use of the state force available to him to regulate parades. He chose Portadown as one of four locations on which to focus. The scene for ‘Drumcree Sunday’ 1985 was set, when on 6 July the RUC announced that the Church Parade would be allowed through The Tunnel the next day, but that the other parades on 12th and 13th July would not be. Some Orangemen wanted to accept the change and go on with their celebrations. Others wanted to ‘converge’ in Portadown as a protest.

The minority of hot heads wanted to storm the Police barricades and march through. Serious rioting ensued and tensions between the Loyalist community and the RUC in Portadown ran very high for a number of years. Dozens of RUC officers were intimidated or burnt out of their homes and many Loyalists felt that they had been betrayed by ‘their police force.

There was also much discussion between the Portadown District, Unionist politicians and the RUC over the following months, and an agreement was eventually reached – the first of many negotiated in haste in times of great stress, and subsequently subject to differing understandings by the parties involved. In this case the Orangemen believed they had agreed to give up marching along Obins Street in exchange for a permanent guarantee that they could march along the Garvaghy Road. The police claim there was no such commitment. There is no written record of the agreement.

Since 1986, the Orange parade has marched out to Drumcree Parish Church via Corcrain Rd, Charles St and Dungannon Road, although LOL No 1 continue, to this day, to include Obins Street in their notified route. The return part of the parade route continued to be directed via the Garvaghy Road. Although there was opposition to the parade by some residents on the Garvaghy Road, and large numbers of police and
soldiers were required for the parade to pass, the number of incidents was minimal until 1995.

Despite Orange claims that Opposition to the parades down the Garvaghy Road had been whipped up by the IRA, it was SDLP leader John Hume who, in 1986, objected to the rerouting of parades from Obins Street and the Tunnel while still permitting them to march down the Garvaghy Road. He claimed that this was capitulation by the authorities to Orange bullying, since the Garvaghy Road was predominantly Catholic. (McKay, 2000)

In 1995, the situation changed dramatically and the current series of ‘Drumcree Sunday’ parades and associated policing operations began. On Sunday 9th July 1995, for the first time in 188 years, the RUC prevented an Orange Order march from proceeding to Portadown on its way back from an annual church service at Drumcree. More than 1000 police officers were called to ‘Drumcree’ in an attempt to ward off any ensuing trouble.

The Orangemen were thrown into immediate disarray (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 104). Orange Order members and others rioted, attempting to break through the police barricades. The police fired 24 plastic bullets. Meanwhile, thousands more Loyalists continued to arrive in Portadown, and the Orange Order leaders and senior police officers engaged in talks in an attempt to resolve the crisis.

These talks also involved the Nationalist residents, led by Brendan MacCionnaith, and shortly before 9.30am on 11 July a verbal agreement was reached that the Parade could proceed along the Garvaghy Road but without any bands. Nationalist protesters, who had until this time been sitting on the road, moved quietly aside and stood watching as approximately 500 Orangemen walked silently down the road, led by Unionist MPs David Trimble and Ian Paisley. When the parade reached the centre of Portadown, Paisley and Trimble raised their arms up in the air in what appeared to be a gesture of triumph. This led to considerable ill-feeling among the residents of the Garvaghy Road who believed that both the RUC and the Orange Order had broken their word (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 125).

The issue of parades was again high on the political agenda at a time when the embryonic peace process was moving towards the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ of 1998. Residents groups were becoming prominent in a number of nationalist areas and the number one item on their agenda was parades. A speech by Gerry Adams congratulating Republicans for the hard work they had done in particular areas (Jarman et al., 1998) enabled the Orange Order and others to portray the issue as a false one, stirred up by Sinn Fein to attack protestant culture. This of course ignores the long history associated with parades in Portadown, but equally, there is no doubt that Sinn Fein used the issue to great effect politically (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 135).

There was now a general recognition by Ministers and officials at Stormont Castle, inside the RUC and throughout the Nationalist Community, that ‘Drumcree’ had been elevated to the forefront of the Unionist Political Agenda (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 136).

On ‘Drumcree Sunday’ 7th July 1996, Hugh Annesley, the then Chief Constable of the RUC, had decided to prevent the return parade from using the Garvaghy Road. The parade was again stopped at Drumcree Bridge, just down the hill from the church. A standoff commenced immediately, with a steady increase in violence throughout Northern Ireland, with major routes being blocked by Orangemen and
Loyalist supporters. At Drumcree, demonstrators attempted to break through the barbed wire barricades erected by the police and army, and threw stones and bottles. The police reacted, with plastic bullets injuring three loyalist supporters.

During the following four days the conflict escalated and widened: Michael McGoldrick, a Catholic taxi driver in Lurgan was murdered; over 100 incidents of intimidation took place; there were 758 attacks on the police; 50 RUC police were injured; and 662 plastic baton rounds were fired by the police.

The public order situation was getting worse, Northern Ireland was fast approaching anarchy and 12 July 1996 was looming with the Orange Order threatening to bring 100,000 Orangemen to Drumcree. On the morning of Thursday 11th July, the Chief Constable reversed his original decision to re-route the parade. Approximately 1200 Portadown Orangemen were allowed to march down the Garvaghy Road. The RUC moved quickly onto the Garvaghy Road, supported by large numbers of the military, and cleared the Nationalists residents from the road, pushing them back into the estates on either side to allow the Orange Order parade to pass. Rioting erupted immediately in Nationalist areas, most notably on the Garvaghy Road, as well as in north and west Belfast, Derry and Armagh. The decision sparked off major discussions about who governs Northern Ireland, the role of policing and the impartiality of the police force (Garvaghy Residents, 1999). The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ireland, Cardinal Daly said:

I don’t think there is any way in which the decision could have been favourably received but the way in which it was executed made it still more unfavourably received. It had a devastating effect on the relationship between the RUC and the Catholic community. I have no doubt about that. (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 170)

The mishandling of ‘Drumcree’ 1996 imposed a terrible legacy on the RUC, exacerbated the long-standing problem of policing a divided society without full consent and co-operation, and, at a single stroke, destroyed 25 years of painful and increasingly tangible progress in transforming the relationship between the RUC and the Catholic minority community (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 177). It cost in excess of £40 million. The RUC appeared either unprepared, or unable, to stand up to intimidation from the Orange Order. (Jarman et al., 1998)

Sir Patrick Mayhew, the then Northern Ireland Secretary of State, set up an independent review of parades and marches in Northern Ireland. The review recommended the creation of a Parades Commission who, among other things, would take over the decision-making about parades that the police had traditionally exercised. The police made decisions on a single narrow criterion – the public order impact – but the Parades Commission would consider other factors such as community impact (Ryder and Kearney, 2001: 178).

The Parades Commission was not fully functional in time for the 1997 marching season, and as ‘Drumcree Sunday’ approached there was no accommodation between Loyal Orange Order No 1 and the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition (GRRRC). On 3 July 1997, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) issued a death threat against Catholics if the march was not allowed to proceed.

On Sunday 6th July 1997 at 3.55am, without prior warning, 1500 RUC officers and supporting British soldiers moved onto the Garvaghy Road and sealed off the
area. Rioting occurred and plastic bullets were fired. Later, around 1.15pm, the Orange Order parade was allowed to proceed down the Garvaghy Road. Rioting spread during the rest of the day to other Nationalist areas of Northern Ireland. Later that day, the RUC Chief Constable, Ronnie Flanagan, said that he had decided to allow the parade to pass down the Garvaghy Road because of the threats to Catholics from Loyalist paramilitaries.

On Monday 29th June 1998, the Parades Commission issued its first determination on the ‘Drumcree Sunday’ parade planned for Sunday 5th July 1998. The determination stated the parade would be re-routed so that it would not pass down the Garvaghy Road. The determination tried to be optimistic and positive:

We would also want to stress that our decision relates to 1998 alone. There are many elements of the Drumcree Church Parade which are not at odds with most of the factors in our guidelines. For example, it is a Church Parade, it has been demonstrated that it can take place in an orderly fashion, and the Garvaghy Road is an arterial route. However, we see the need to break the cycle in 1998. The opportunity to provide it by such a break should be seized by political, community and religious leaders to demonstrate greater responsibility and to make strident efforts to bridge the caesium between both sides of the community so laying the foundations for a more tolerant atmosphere in future. (Parades Commission, 1998)

At Sunday lunchtime, the stand-off commenced. Prominent national figures arrived later, including the Grand Master of the Orange Order and Ian Paisley. Overnight, there was rioting in a number of Protestant areas of Northern Ireland and people who sympathized with the Drumcree Orange men also blocked a number of roads across the province. As the week progressed, the situation deteriorated. Harold Gracey the LOL No 1 leader appealed for unity. ‘We are all one family’, he said, ‘The only way we’ll win is by standing together.’ He assured the brethren that he knew for a fact that it was not the Portadown police who had decided there should be no one at the barrier to take a letter from the Order – the implication being that the Portadown police were loyal. Outsiders were to blame (McKay, 2000).

It was expected that the crisis in Northern Ireland over ‘Drumcree’ would intensify over the 12th July weekend. Violence continued at Drumcree each night. At roughly 4.30am on the morning of Sunday 12th July 1998 three young Catholic boys (Jason, Mark and Richard Quinn, aged 8, 9 and 10 years old) were burned to death when their home was fire-bombed by Loyalists in a sectarian attack.

Spokesmen for the Orange Order tried to argue that there was no connection between this incident (and indeed all the other acts of violence) and the situation at Drumcree. However, many supporters from other parts of Northern Ireland left Drumcree in confusion and shame, and the numbers of protesters decreased considerably.

During the 1998 parade and demonstration, a total of 2561 public order incidents were recorded: 144 houses were damaged in attacks; 467 vehicles were damaged; 615 attacks were made on members of the security forces, including 24 shooting incidents and 45 blast bombs; 76 police offices were injured; 284 people arrested; 632 petrol bombs thrown; 2250 petrol bombs recovered by the RUC; and 837 plastic baton rounds fired by the RUC.
Since July 1998, the first time the parade was prevented from marching down the Garvaghy Road, there have been scores of marches and parades in Portadown and elsewhere in Northern Ireland in support of LOL No 1’s position. A token demonstration was maintained by the Orange Order at Drumcree from July 1998 to July 1999. The Orange Order also organized hundreds of demonstrations and marches in Portadown and across Northern Ireland in support of its demand to be allowed to parade down the Garvaghy Road. Between 1998 and 2001 a number of high-powered mediation efforts were tried and failed. Most have continued up until the last possible minute before each year’s ‘Drumcree Sunday’ parade.

In 2002 the by now traditional determination from the Parades Commission for ‘Drumcree Sunday’ again prohibited the return parade from the Garvaghy Road. The scene was set for another ‘Drumcree Sunday’ but this year there were a number of significant differences in the strategy adopted by the police and the army. The analysis of these differences and the events of 2002 and 2003, are the subject of this case study of Drumcree.

Adaptive Leadership to Create Public Value

The above section illustrates the complexity and long standing nature of the conflicts surrounding the Drumcree Sunday parade and its policing. It also illustrates the extent to which the local conflicts are caught up in wider national and international questions about ‘the troubles’ in Northern Ireland. The volatility in the political economic and social context of Drumcree did not diminish in 2002 and 2003. The new ingredient introduced into the situation was a significant change in policing strategy, strongly informed by Chief Superintendent Irwin Turbitt’s appointment as Silver Commander for the operation, and his interest in theories of public value and of adaptive leadership, to which he had been introduced in his Warwick MPA degree course.

What do we mean by ‘public value’? Moore’s seminal book *Creating Public Value* (1995) aims to develop, for public policymakers and managers, an equivalent to the notion of private value in the private commercial sector. Moore suggests that strategic managers need to address and to align three key questions: first, what precisely is the value that we plan to add to the public realm in this situation, and how will we recognise those public value outcomes?; second, how do we generate the necessary authorization and negotiate a coalition of sufficient support among both internal and external stakeholders, to achieve these public value outcomes?; and third, what operational capability (e.g. finance, technology, people, skills) is necessary to achieve these public value outcomes, and where, how and when does it need to be deployed?

What do we mean by ‘adaptive leadership’? Heifetz’s theory of adaptive leadership (1994) argues that a distinction needs to be made between technical problems (where there is a general agreement about the diagnosis of the problem, and about the nature of the action required to solve it) and adaptive problems (where there is uncertainty, confusion or disagreement about the nature of the problem, and about the action required to tackle it). He argues that adaptive problems require a different kind of leadership from the tackling of technical problems – leadership which rejects the pressure from followers to provide magical solutions to complex problems, and
instead works with stakeholders to take responsibility for grappling with these problems and for the changes in one’s own thinking and behaviour that are required.

Heifetz suggests a framework of seven principles for adaptive leadership:

1. Identify the adaptive challenge – the changes in thinking and behaviour (including one’s own) required to grapple with difficult issues.
2. Give the work back to the people faced by the problem – avoid the temptation to solve people’s problems for them and instead engage them in the adaptive work and in taking responsibility for the change process.
3. Regulate the distress necessary for adaptive work – creating and maintaining sufficient heat to keep things cooking, but not so much heat that everything boils over and spoils. Use conflict constructively.
4. Create a ‘holding environment’ in which the painful adaptive work can be done effectively; this can be a physical and/or a psychological space, providing both safety and also stretch and challenge.
5. Maintain disciplined attention – recognize the seductions of work avoidance and other displacement activity (e.g. dependency, projection, fight/flight), and relentlessly bring the focus back on to the primary task.
6. Protect the voices from below or outside – ensure that all perspectives and interests are considered, that minority viewpoints are taken into account, and that dominant views are questioned and challenged.
7. Move continuously between the balcony and the battlefield – combine a helicopter overview of the whole situation and strategy, with an understanding of the changing situation at the front-line.

Turbitt consciously used these two frameworks of public value and adaptive leadership to analyse and lead the adaptive changes in policy and practice required in the policing of the Drumcree Sunday parades in 2002 and 2003. We will therefore organise the rest of this paper around this framework.

**Identifying the Adaptive Challenge, and the Public Value Outcomes to be Achieved**

In preparing to act as Drumcree Silver Commander, Turbitt identified the adaptive challenge for the police as being how to restore public order and adherence to the law, instead of just containing the demonstrators, and preventing them from parading down the Garvaghy Road. The adaptive challenge he presented to the Orange Order in 2002 was thus how to carry out their parade within the framework of the law. This involved their leaders taking responsibility for those within their midst who acted unlawfully.

In thinking out the adaptive leadership challenge, Turbitt also made use of the concept of public value and of the strategic triangle. This focused his attention on the public value outcomes to be achieved, the authorizing coalition to be negotiated, and the operational capacity necessary to achieve the outcomes.

The input side of the Drumcree equation is pretty clear. Each July, in preparation
for ‘Drumcree Sunday’, the police and British army mount a huge operation in the Portadown area. This involves around 1300 Orangemen on the parade, 1000 police and 2000 army personnel, plus large quantities of military hardware – armoured personnel carriers, crowd control obstacles (CCOs), barricades, barbed wire installations, water cannons and so on. The cost of policing this event, with army back up, is estimated at around £1 million every year.

The output side of the Drumcree equation is also fairly clear and visible, in terms of damage to property, people and reputation. For example, in 1998, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland estimated that the financial cost of Drumcree was £40 million; and many commentators attribute David Trimble’s election as leader of the Ulster Unionist party to his robust stand on the Drumcree issue in 2000. However, it has been less clear what outcomes the police have been trying to achieve, apart from trying to contain the violence between the various factions.

In approaching Drumcree from the new perspective, Turbitt found himself asking what value was attempting to be created and added to the public realm in this specific situation. His conclusion was that the police had not been able to focus on the public value outcomes they wanted to achieve (the restoration of law and order), because they had got trapped into trying to act as a neutral referee in the conflict between loyalists and republicans.

The police can use three main tactics in public order conflicts: containment, dispersal and arrest (ACPO Public Order Manual). Turbitt concluded that their understandable preoccupation with containment and dispersal had prevented the police from being able to use the third tactic – arrest of those committing criminal offences, which would have helped to re-establish the rule of law in the situation. He therefore started to think about how to create the authorizing environment necessary to achieve these public value goals, breaking the mould of previous years of acting as neutral referee, and moving forward instead to positively promote public order and to arrest those who broke the law by committing criminal offences.

First, he had to achieve a mandate for the new strategy from his Assistant Chief Constable and Gold Commander, which he did – if only because there was widespread feeling that the level of injury sustained by the police the previous year could not be tolerated. However, this was not sufficient by itself to create a robust authorizing environment among both internal and external stakeholders. Internally, Turbitt organized a series of discussions with his police and army colleagues in early 2002 about what they were trying to achieve and how. He went further in 2003 (after it had become clear from the 2002 debrief that the police and military commanders needed to do more joint preparation) and organized a high level workshop on public value for all the police and army commanders who would be involved in the Drumcree operation. He invited Harvard Professor Mark Moore (author of Creating Public Value) to lead this workshop, using the classic Harvard case study method to promote active engagement in the new thinking. The cases used by Moore deliberately had nothing to do with policing, with conflict, or with Northern Ireland, and were designed to shift people out of their familiar thought patterns. It was fascinating at the workshop to see that no one was willing to join in this case discussion until the Army Brigadier had first done so, thereby legitimating their involvement in innovative thinking about public value outcomes. These discussions and this workshop helped to provide a new framework of concepts and language within which
Turbitt could discuss and develop the new strategy for Drumcree with both his police and army colleagues.

Turbitt developed the necessary authorization from external stakeholders for the new strategy, by opening up discussions with politicians of all parties, religious leaders of all persuasions, paramilitary groups from both loyalist and republican sections, neighbourhood community organizations, and with the plethora of other agencies and individuals with a stake of some kind in the Drumcree situation. He told them of the proposed change of emphasis in the police strategy, away from containment and towards the promotion of public order. He argued that this shifted responsibility onto the protagonists for demonstrating within the framework of the law, and informed them that the police would aim to arrest and press criminal charges against anyone found breaking the law. It was difficult for anyone to argue against this strategy and in favour of law-breaking, so formal authorization for the new strategy was achieved from all the main stakeholders. We will see later that this authorizing coalition came under great strain when evidence of violent law breaking was found against several very respectable church-goers, who were not at all happy to be arrested on criminal charges.

The third element of the public value strategic triangle to which Turbitt paid fresh attention was operational capability: how far was this fit for purpose and aligned with the public value goals and desired outcomes? In previous years, the police and army had prevented the Orangemen from parading down the mainly Catholic Garvaghy Road by installing very large and heavy Crowd Control Obstacles (CCOs) (a 30 ton barrier, built around a shipping container filled with concrete) to block off the Drumcree bridge which provided access to the Garvaghy Road. They had also ploughed the surrounding fields, dug deep ditches and installed long high stretches of barbed wire to prevent the demonstrators from surging across the fields adjoining the bridge.

How effective was all this in achieving the public value outcomes desired, i.e. the restoration and maintenance of public order? Turbitt concluded that this kind of battle-field environment had reinforced the symbolism of violent conflict, and had removed responsibility from the demonstrators for policing their own behaviour and acting within the law. The large scale installations also frustrated the police from achieving their new public value outcomes – they assisted containment of the crowd, but made arrest and the restoration of the law and of public order harder. (It is hard to get clear evidence of law breaking let alone to go out and arrest individuals if you are separated by a 10ft barricade and a wall of barbed wire!)

Turbitt therefore decided to reduce the height and weight of the CCOs, and to install a much lower and lighter mini CCO (7ft high and weighing 3 tons, rather than 10ft high, weighing 30 tons). The mini CCO was designed to look more like a civilian traffic control installation (painted in yellow stripes) than military hardware. He also decided to re-design the shape of the razor-wire installations to better support the aims of the new strategy. The razor-wire coils had previously been stretched out in long straight lines alongside a deep ditch. This conjured up images of First World War trenches, and of embattled dug-in conflict, and also made arrest more difficult for the police. Turbitt therefore asked the Army engineers to redesign the razor-wire installation into a kind of lobster pot funnel, to assist arrest of any who decided to venture across the ploughed fields and deepened ditch.
The detailed logistics for implementing the new strategy were confirmed and rehearsed in the week leading up to Drumcree Sunday. On the Monday of that week, the Parades Commission makes their Determination as to which of the three options will be approved for that year: no return parade down Garvaghy Rd; return parade with agreement from the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition; or return parade without agreement. In 2002, as in the five previous years, the Parades Commission ruled in favour of the first option. On the Wednesday, the operational orders and the scenarios were formally signed out (with detailed documentation, in case of subsequent public enquiry).

On Thursday, the Gold, and Silver commanders briefed all police and military commanders and specialist staff (over 100 people) for 90 minutes. This was followed by a separate briefing for Bronze commanders and Tactical Support Group commanders about the use of the plastic baton gun. This is the highest level of force likely to be used by the police in riot conditions, and only under specific authorization by the Silver Commander. In previous years there had been some ambiguity about the use of the baton gun, and some of the frontline police felt that they had sustained injury as a result of this confusion. Careful prior clarification about the law and about policy for the use of the baton gun was clearly an essential part of Turbitt’s leadership role, particularly given the new strategy he had proposed to re-establish law and order by giving the responsibility back to the stakeholders in the dispute, and by reducing the height of the Crowd Control Obstacles.

Giving the Work Back to the People with the Problem

Identifying the adaptive challenge is the first element in Heifetz’s model of adaptive leadership. The second is giving the work back to the people with the problem. The police had been under pressure from many different factions within the population (protestant and catholic; unionist and republican; politicians and community organizations) to solve, or at least to contain, the problems of Drumcree. As early as 1996, the RUC Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley had said that the police ‘were sick to the back teeth of being the meat in the sandwich between two intransigent communities’.

In order to break out of this trap, and to prepare to give the work back to the people with the problem, in the weeks and months before Drumcree Sunday, Turbitt established community consultative groups with four key groups of stakeholders: unionist politicians, nationalist politicians, Loyal Orange Lodge number 1 (Portadown), and the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition. Regular meetings took place with all four groups, both in the run-up to Drumcree Sunday, and throughout the 10 days of the operation. Turbitt attended all these meetings with the police chief inspector in charge of Drumcree planning.

In these meetings he argued that the responsibility for demonstrating within the law had to be taken by the groups concerned and that the police’s responsibility was to ensure that public order was upheld, and that anyone breaking the law would be arrested charged and prosecuted in the criminal courts. This was understood and agreed by all stakeholders, but proved to require painful adaptation in thinking and behaviour, both by the police and by the Orange Order, as we will see from the unfolding sequence of events in 2002.
On Sunday morning 6th July 2002, about 1200 Orangemen and women, plus approximately 100 band members and supporters, set off from Portadown town centre, marching to pipe and drum bands, in the outward parade up Corcrain Road, Charles Street and Dungannon Road, to Drumcree Parish Church (Church of Ireland). Only about 100 nationalists – a much smaller number than previous years – watched the Orange parade as it passed St John’s Catholic Church at the top of Garvaghy Rd, standing in silence behind toughened Perspex screens erected by the police to keep the two sides apart.

After a religious service in Drumcree church, taken by Reverend Pickering, and broadcast to those standing outside who couldn’t get into the church building, the Orangemen reassembled and marched three abreast, accompanied by a band playing the hymn ‘Abide With Me’, to the barrier at Drumcree Bridge, which had been erected by the police and army earlier that morning. In keeping with the new strategy of shifting responsibility to the demonstrators, this barrier was much smaller and lighter than previous years – a construction 6 ft or 7ft high made with corrugated iron, with locked gates at the front.

At the barrier, the deputy district Grandmaster of the Portadown Orange Lodge, David Burrows, told the crowd, who were waving Union flags and furled umbrellas, that by refusing to agree to the Orange march back through the mainly Catholic Garvaghy Rd, the nationalists lacked Christian charity and instead were behaving like paranoid fascists, of the same kind that led the Nazis to imprison Polish Jews.

Burrows handed a letter of protest to Assistant Chief Constable Stephen White, who had opened the barrier and come forward to receive it. White commended the dignity of the parade, but when he refused to let them pass through to march down Garvaghy Rd some of the loyalist supporters shouted ‘coward’ and ‘scumbag’, and spat on him. Within minutes of the formal proceedings ending with the singing of the British national anthem, a protester had climbed on top of the (smaller and lighter) tin barrier, and taunted the police on the other side, while another set light to an Irish tricolour flag. The crowd charged the barrier, hurling rocks and stones at it and at the police, and then others grabbed hold of the construction and tried to push and bend it to the ground. Eventually they broke through, to confront a solid row of police in full black riot gear, with shields.

There were then several minutes of sustained assault, with a crowd of Orange supporters throwing rocks, bottles, branches and other missiles at the police, and the police responding by striking offenders with their truncheons, and firing three plastic baton rounds (bullets), which brought at least one offender to the ground with an injured arm.

The Assistant Chief Constable, as the Gold Commander, ordered the bringing in by Army lorry of the Maxi CCO to replace the smashed Mini CCO – this was a much larger and heavier installation built from two shipping containers filled with concrete and weighing 30 tons. This was a complex operation and took much longer than it had done in rehearsal, because the driver who had rehearsed the manoeuvre was part of the evening shift (as this was when most of the violence had occurred in previous years) and the driver on the morning shift had not been rehearsed (because violence had never before erupted straight after the morning church service). For similar unfortunate reasons, the water cannon vehicle was still in transit and had not yet arrived at the Drumcree Bridge.
These two factors meant that the police were dangerously exposed for about half an hour to direct violence from the crowd without any protection from Crowd Control Obstacles or Water Cannon, and were forced into more-or-less hand to hand combat, protected only by their riot gear and shields. Eventually, the Maxi CCO was installed on the bridge, and the water cannon used to regain control. However, during this period, 31 police officers were injured, including five seriously so and who required hospital treatment (in one case requiring reconstructive surgery for the mouth and lip).

**Regulating the Distress Necessary for Adaptive Work**

Turbitt was visibly distressed by the above turn of events. At the height of the violence at the Drumcree bridge, he and I and many of the senior police and army officers and security and intelligence staff were at the HQ (about two miles away from Drumcree bridge). They were monitoring the whole battle-scene via a bank of CCTV screens, fed by video cameras placed at strategic points around the route of the whole march, and by cameras mounted on the army helicopters which were flying overhead throughout the operation. This gave an outstanding strategic overview of the whole battlefield, and also allowed the cameras to pan in close enough for the intelligence service to identify specific individuals committing criminal acts.

However, Turbitt was not close enough to the front-line to follow the detail of the action, or to support his injured officers. It took us at least 10 minutes to reach the front-line in an armour-plated Land Rover, and to begin to piece together what had happened. (Turbitt made sure that this dilemma was not repeated the following year when he was again Silver Commander for the policing of Drumcree Sunday 2003 – see paragraph below on ‘Moving Between the Balcony and the Battlefield’).

At this stage in the Drumcree Sunday operation, it appeared that the new strategy had failed painfully. The attempt to shift responsibility back on to the people with the problem seemed not to have worked – the Orange Order had failed to contain their followers to demonstrate within the framework of the law. The reduction in the size and scale of the CCO barrier had not led to less hostility but to more. Some of the operational detail had gone wrong (the length of time to get the maxi CCO in place on the bridge after the smashing of the mini CCO, and the delay in the arrival of the water cannon). And 31 police officers had been injured as a direct consequence of the new strategy. If the Maxi CCO had been in place from the beginning, as in previous years, it is much less likely that the violence and missiles could have reached and injured them.

However, the theory of adaptive leadership suggests that a degree of distress is necessary for achieving changes in thinking and behaviour, and that this distress must be regulated carefully.

Turbitt concluded that at this stage, a disproportionate share of the distress was being experienced by the police. He therefore set about increasing the level of distress experienced by the demonstrators by organizing the rapid arrest of those offenders where there was clear video evidence of criminal behaviour.

One of Turbitt’s innovations in 2002, in pursuit of the new criminal justice strategy, was to improve the collection of evidence in real time. A Detective Chief Inspector was delegated to coordinate the collection of ‘the best evidence of the worst
offences by the worst offenders’. The video monitoring system allowed him to actively build cases against people as the event happened and he was then immediately in a position to begin directing arrests of people leaving the scene. The first arrests came two hours later as people were identified on a bus returning to Belfast (25 miles away) that had been tracked from the scene by a helicopter and stopped by one of the tactical support group (TSG) units in an armoured Land Rover. Within a few days, 30 people had been arrested, 20 of them charged with riot at common law, 5 with riotous behaviour, and 5 prosecuted for disorderly behaviour. Common law riot is a very serious charge and requires very strong evidence to secure a conviction. This time that evidence was available on video, and those charged were denied bail and spent time on remand in jail – including some well know members of the Orange Order and their supporters. This had never happened before at Drumcree, and caused a lot of discontent within the Orange community.

Turbitt came under pressure from many quarters to drop or to reduce the charges, but he judged that the distress needed to be maintained if the necessary adaptive changes in thinking and behaviour were to be achieved. Eventually, on Monday 3rd November 2003, at the High Court in Belfast, 15 people pleaded guilty to common law riot and received suspended prison sentences of 12 to 18 months.

However, Heifetz suggests that one of the leadership skills is to regulate the distress carefully – creating and maintaining sufficient heat to keep things cooking, but not so much heat that everything boils over and spoils. We will see later that in preparing for the following year’s Drumcree Sunday demonstrations, Turbitt had to reduce the distress experienced by the leadership of the Orange Order if they were to be able to continue to engage in adaptive change.

Creating a Safe but Challenging ‘Holding Environment’

The Orange Order flag paraded at Drumcree has as its insignia a Crown on top of a Bible, with the inscription ‘Here We Stand: We Can Do No Other. Civil and Religious Liberty’. This clearly symbolizes their perception and presentation of themselves in terms of loyalty to the British Crown and adherence to the authority of the Bible. The Drumcree Sunday march is therefore seen by them as a public celebration and defence of religious beliefs and principles, and historic political rights. Turbitt’s new strategy had challenged this self-perception, and forced them to face up to, and take responsibility for, the painful fact that their supporters were also breaking the criminal law through riots and violence. The officials of the Orange Order felt angry and humiliated by this and by the media coverage which portrayed them as law-breakers, rather than as defenders of historic religious principles and political rights.

When Turbitt went to meet the Portadown Loyal Orange Lodge (LOL1) after Drumcree Sunday 2002, he initially expected to have to maintain or increase the level of their distress, in order to mobilize further adaptation in thinking and behaviour. Instead, he found that he had to reduce the distress and to create a safe holding environment within which wounds could be healed, pride restored and adaptive work could resume.

The concept of a ‘holding environment’ is a physical or organizational space, with clear boundaries, within which the painful stretching work of adapting one’s own thinking and behaviour can be done. Turbitt had redrawn the physical holding
environment (replacing the heavy military hardware of the maxi CCO, with the lower key mini CCO) in order to begin to ‘normalize’ the situation and to restore law and order. The destruction of this physical boundary by the demonstrators, and their use of physical violence against the police, had visibly demonstrated that considerable adaptive work still needed to be done to normalize the situation.

The police responded by re-asserting another kind of boundary and holding environment – the framework of the law. The criminal prosecutions against those where there was video and other evidence of law-breaking (whatever their status within the Orange Order or the wider community), was a public statement that although the boundaries of the physical holding environment might be breached, the boundary between law-keeping and law-breaking would be maintained, without fear or favour. Benington has long argued that ‘divide and rule’ can be used as a very positive leadership strategy, when the basis of the division is moved to a higher level. In this case, the police were asserting that the divisions between Orange and Green, unionist and republican, protestant and catholic, were subordinate to a higher division between those who kept the law and those who didn’t. Nelson Mandela and the ANC used a similar leadership strategy in post-apartheid South Africa, in establishing that the post-apartheid government would protect and promote the interests of white as well as black and coloured people so long as they worked within the framework of democracy and the law.

**Maintaining Disciplined Attention**

In reviewing Drumcree 2002 and preparing for Drumcree 2003, Turbitt faced many pressures to divert attention from the adaptive leadership strategy he had attempted in 2002, and to revert to the previous strategy based upon confronting the demonstrators with superior force from both the police and the army. The Orange Order were very anxious to avoid any repeat of the previous year’s violence and pleaded for the restoration of the maxi CCO. Turbitt interpreted this as avoidance of the adaptive challenge still facing the Orange Order – preferring to hide behind a large barrier set up by the police rather than to take responsibility for the law-breaking within their own ranks. Turbitt therefore had to maintain disciplined attention on the primary task, and to insist that the police would enact the same strategy as the previous year – using a mini rather than a maxi CCO, and prosecuting anyone found breaking the law. The adaptive challenge facing the Orange Order was therefore how to maintain law and order amongst their members and supporters, in order to avoid a repetition of the previous year’s arrests, criminal charges and public humiliation. (The pressure on LOL1 was all the greater because some of their members and supporters were still on remand, awaiting trial.)

Turbitt and his colleagues spent time in several rounds of discussions with LOL1 in the latter part of 2002 and the first half of 2003, to keep the focus on this challenge and to help them make this adaptation in their thinking and behaviour. By the time of Drumcree Sunday 2003, the Orange Order were ready to take responsibility for the marshalling of the Parade. This included supporting the police in setting up and manning a Vehicle Control Point on Drumgoose Road early on the Sunday morning, to control access to the Drumcree area before the church service. And even more importantly, perhaps, putting their own orange tape in front of the CCO at the
Drumcree Bridge to symbolize that they accepted that this was the legal boundary within which they were going to conduct their parade, albeit with protest.

The mood of the Drumcree Parade on Sunday 6th July 2003 was therefore quite different from that of the previous year. Firstly, the wider political context for Northern Ireland politics had begun to change as a result of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and the stop/go moves towards ceasefire and a democratic assembly. Secondly, the numbers involved in the Parade were much lower than previous years. Estimates suggest that the number of Orange men and their supporters was around 700 rather than 1000. (Many were said to have stayed away because of the previous year’s arrests and criminal charges.) The catholic/republican Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition were also much less prominent than in previous years. Indeed, they had almost no visible presence in any of the nationalist areas and people were rumoured to have gone on holiday or away for the weekend to signify that the violence was an Orange problem and not theirs. Thirdly, LOL1 had taken the bold step of announcing that they would be willing to have face to face talks with the Garvaghy Road residents in order to try to achieve a resolution to the long standing Drumcree dispute. There were press leaks about aiming for a negotiated solution in which the Orange Order would complete their march down Garvaghy Road by agreement with the nationalist residents. (This created enormous tension within the Orange Order both locally and nationally and the leaders of LOL1 were accused of selling out by some of their supporters – adaptive leadership to tackle tough problems can often open up internal divisions.) Fourthly, it was clear that the Orange LOL1 leadership had clearly grasped the nettle and was taking responsibility for ‘policing’ their Parade within the framework of the law, albeit with protest.

The march from Portadown centre took place as usual, accompanied by bands and drums playing traditional Protestant hymns. The sermon at the Drumcree church service included an appeal for an end to the conflict and a search for peace. After the church service the speeches by the Orange leadership at the barrier at Drumcree Bridge protested about the decision of ‘an unelected quango’ (the Parades Commission) preventing British citizens from exercising their democratic rights, but did not include an explicit attack upon the police or upon the nationalist community. The traditional letter of protest was handed in to the police at the barrier, but no attempt was made to pull the barrier down (the same smaller size CCO as the previous year, with a warning notice displayed on it saying that any interference with the barrier was a criminal offence). No violence took place and the Parade dispersed peacefully in the early afternoon.

In 2005 and 2006 the Police continued to pay disciplined attention to the Drumcree issue, and to pursue the same ‘adaptive leadership’ strategy, with the result that there was no violence of any kind at the Drumcree parades. Indeed the Orange Parade was displaced from the front page news by other matters, and for the first time in his career Turbitt was able to take summer holidays with his family in July!

**Protecting the Voices without Authority**

The adaptive leadership strategy at Drumcree could not have been developed and implemented simply from the top down. It also needed the active involvement and engagement of a wide range of different stakeholders, some with formal authority
and some without. Turbitt certainly had to gain the support of his superiors within the police for the new approach, and to communicate it clearly to his subordinates within the command and control hierarchy of the police. In addition, he had to liaise (laterally) with his colleagues and counterparts within the army hierarchy, and make sure they understood, bought into and supported the new policing strategy. All this was necessary but not sufficient.

The biggest leadership challenge was to develop a robust dialogue and negotiation with those in the Orange Order and the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition where changes in thinking and behaviour were needed. Turbitt and the police were willing to use state authority and the framework of the law to create a firm, reliable and consistent holding environment. However, the adaptive change could not have taken place unless, and until, the protagonists within the Orange Order accepted the need for them to take responsibility for leading their followers to protest within the framework of the law. Turbitt had no authority to command the Orange Order to do this. Their active engagement in the adaptive change process required painstaking discussions and negotiations, not only with their formal leaders, but also with their local membership. It involved listening to and engaging with those without formal authority but with a great deal of influence.

It was fascinating to see that the sources of authority differed considerably between the Orange Order and the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition. The Orange Order think and act hierarchically – their prime loyalty is to the Crown and the Bible. The Garvaghy Road residents take their authority from below – they see themselves as a coalition of residents within the Garvaghy Road grassroots community, who make their own democratic decisions about policy and refuse to accept instruction from above, even from Irish nationalist parties and politicians, let alone the British government.

The important lesson for the police in orchestrating the process of adaptive leadership was not simply to try to referee between the contesting groups, but to actively engage with all groups, to challenge them to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions, and then to adapt their thinking and behaviour in line with the law.

**Moving Between the Balcony and the Battlefield**

[11]Heifetz’s notion of moving continuously between the balcony and the battlefield challenges much traditional thinking about the need to separate strategy from operations. In grappling with complex problem situations, in which neither the diagnosis of the problem, nor its solution, is known or agreed, it is not possible to develop a systematic strategy and then just to implement it in a linear way. The problem includes, but goes beyond, the military insight that ‘even the best strategy does not survive the first contact with the enemy’. Under conditions of complexity, volatility and continuing uncertainty it may be necessary to keep recreating and adjusting the strategy in the light of changing conditions, and of feedback from the environment.

Turbitt certainly found it helpful to keep moving between the balcony (which provides a strategic overview of the whole field of action and of all the different stakeholders), and the battlefield (where people are ‘in the trenches and up to their necks in the muck and the bullets’). The development of the adaptive leadership strategy involved a combination of sophisticated future thinking and scenario planning (and
the production of many volumes of strategic planning documents), with equally careful attention to operational and logistical detail.

As noted in the section above, Turbitt was badly thrown when his strategic overview of the action, via CCTV cameras in the police and army HQ, lost contact with the frontline realities of the conflict at Drumcree Bridge, when the mini CCO was smashed down and his police colleagues at the frontline were injured. Turbitt tried to avoid a repetition of this dilemma at Drumcree 2003, by arranging for the army engineers to build a physical ‘balcony’ right beside the bridge and the barrier. This tall scaffolding structure was camouflaged and equipped with CCTV monitor screens so that Turbitt and the other police commanders could maintain a strategic overview while only being yards and seconds away from the live action battlefield at the Drumcree bridge – a further imaginative, if slightly eccentric, attempt by Turbitt to translate theory into practice.

**Conclusion**

In one sense, it is difficult for the authors to draw the conclusions from this case study. In different ways we are both committed partisans, with a vested interest in interpreting the events in a particular way. Although Turbitt’s role was central to the events at Drumcree, we have tried to analyze the leadership issues less in terms of individual heroism and more in terms of a complex process of interaction between many different stakeholders within a volatile political economic context. We particularly welcome feedback and critical comment from those who are reading our account from a greater distance from the action. We feel pleased on three counts. We are firstly happy that a body of academic theory taught in a Business School has helped a practitioner to think and act in an innovative way about a particularly complex and challenging work situation. Secondly, we feel pleased that this innovative thinking and behaviour seems to have contributed in a very practical material way to a break through in the long standing deadlock at Drumcree, and a measurable decrease in the violence and crime surrounding that event. Thirdly, we are pleased that an academic and a practitioner have been able to work closely together, testing the application of theory in practice, and then thinking about the implications of the practice for the theory. Turbitt gained a great deal of insight from his exposure to academic thinking on the Warwick MPA; Benington gained a great deal of insight from his exposure to the muck and the bullets at Drumcree over three successive July weekends. Turbitt has now joined Warwick University as an associate fellow and is contributing to the further development and testing of leadership theory in classroom teaching. All that remains now, to complete the circle, would be for Benington to join the Police Service of Northern Ireland!

**References**


Leadership

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